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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 15394

vs.

LYMAN DAYTON,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge
Jon M. Jeppson
419 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Richard B. Cuatto
318 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 l
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH S. GASSER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 15394

vs.
LYMAN

DAYTON,

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is based on an oral agreement whereby plaintiff transferred
~Y

check $5,000.00 to defendant on August 26, 1969.

Plaintiff alleges the

transfer was a loan to be repaid within one year, whereas defendant alleges
the transfer was an investment, repayment of which was contingent upon the
~rofitability

of a current film venture.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court.

From a Judgment for the defendant of

no cause of action, plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment and Judgment in his favor as
l

matter of 1aw.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff was a r~sident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
-1-for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was a resident of the State of California and engaged in various aspects
of motion picture production during all times material to this action.
During midsummer of 1969, defendant first became acquainted with plaintiff.
(Tr. p. 18)

As a result of conversations between plaintiff and defendant,

plaintiff transferred S5,000.00 to defendant.

(Tr. p. 3, 17-18)

Plaintiff alleges that he loaned $5,000.00 to defendant

. for som'

(Tr. p. 11)

of his business ventures and his family expenses."

Plaintiff

knew defendant was working on a film entitled "Sing a Sad Song for Sarah" arc
that the business venture for which the money would be used was for the fib.
(Tr. p. 11)

Plaintiff further alleges that the money was to be repaid

within one year and although there was never any
plaintiff expected normal interest.

discussion as ~o interest,

(Tr. p. 4-5)

Plaintiff sent the $5,000

check with a letter dated August 26, 1g59, which letter made no mention of
the funds being a loan.

(R. p. 21)

Approximately two years later, plainti:·

for the first time, contacted defendant by letter asking for repayment,
calling the transfer of funds a loan.
letter dated August 16, 1g71_

(Tr. p. 7-8)

(R. p. 22)

Defendant responded by

Finally, on January 13, 1972,

plaintiff wrote defendant a second letter requesting repayment of the funds
because of plaintiff's "very shakey" economic situation. (R. p. 24)
Defendant claims that the $5,000.00 1vas an investment.

He states tha'

sometime in midsummer of 1969, he explained to plaintiff that they were
completing a film called "Sing a Sad Song for Sarah," and that in order to
obtain "answer prints," they needed additional funding.

(Tr. p. 18-19)

Defendant further informed plaintiff that repayment of the funds was condi:
upon the movie generating sufficient revenue to pay the funds back. (Tr. ;.
20)

After receiving plaintiff's letter of August 4, 1971, (R. p. 23), de·

fendant responded by letter dated August 16, 1g71, and enclosed therein

-2-
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"financial program" in order to give plaintiff an "up-to-date progress report"
on the movie. (R. p. 22)

It was rlefendant's custom "to send to each of the

investors a progress report and a projection as to those points of marketinq
strategies that we had tried to put into effect."

(Tr. p. 24)

In defendant's

letter of August 16, 1971, he also stated, "I'm hoping that foroian sales
will make it possible to give a remittance of the $5,000.00 sooner." (R. p. 22)
and that by making that statement, the defendant was "hoping that through
foreign sales, we could generate income so we could return the investment to
Mr. Gasser as well as other investors."

(Tr. p. 25)

Plaintiff received a two

percent interest in the profits of the picture for his $5,000.00 investment.
(Tr. p. 20,32)

Although plaintiff acknowledged that if the film were success-

ful, he would receive a share of the profits, he claims he had no ownership
in the movie.

(Tr. p. 5)

Defendant stated that in some cases investors re-

ceived a written agreement to evidence their ownership, but is not sure who
did and did not receive the written acknowledgment.

(Tr. p. 23-33)

ARGU~1ENT

POINT
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE $5,000.00 RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT WAS AN INVESTMENT.
In its findings of fact, the Trial Court found that the S5,000.00 transferred from plaintiff to defendant was an investment for the movie, "Sing a
Sad Song for Sarah," (Tr. p. 40) and that plaintiff was aware that the funds
·•ere an investment at the time of transfer.

(R. p. 40)

Further, the Trial

Court found that the repayment of the investment was to be made out of the
profits of the film, of which plaintiff had a two percent ownership interest.
(R. p. 40)

It is clear from the record and transcript of the case that there

is substantial evidence to support these findings.
Utah law states that the governing principle for review of this case is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the "substantial evidence rule."
2d

Cannon v. Wright, 531, P.2d 1290,

Utah

This case is a classic example of the reason the substant 1"al ev i denco

rule should govern on appeal.
"As we have often reiterated, it is the prerogative of the Trial

Co~rt _to determine what aspects of the evidence he will believe.

Th1s 1ncludes that he can be selective and choose those portions
?f_the testimony of any witness he thinks has the greater probablllty of be1ng true. Cannon v. Wright, 531, P .2d 1290, Utah 2d.
In the instant case there are four critical questions of fact on which~~
parties' testimony is diametrically opposed:
l.

Was the $5,000.00 a loan or an investment?

Plaintiff claims the

$5,000.00 was a loan while the defendant claims it was an investment.
2.

Was repayment conditional or unconditional?

Plaintiff claims defendlr·

was to repay the funds within a year while defendant claims repayment was
conditional upon the film making a net profit.

3.

How was the $5,000.00 to be used?

Plaintiff claims at first that

he did not know that a portion of the funds would be used for production cos''
of a film, (Tr. p. 9)

but after reviewing his Answers to Interrogatories,

he acknowledges that the funds were to be used for the film.

(Tr. p. 11)

Defendant specifically recalls telling plaintiff funds were needed to compl::
the film, specifically for answer prints. (Tr. p. 19)
4.

Did plaintiff have an ownership interest in the film?

Plaintiff

claims he had no ownership interest in the film, (Tr. p. 5) while defendant
claims plaintiff had a two percent ownership interest in the profits.

(Tr.

p. 20)

The Trial Judge necessarily had to decide which witness was telling the
truth in these critical areas of conflicting testimony.
"Passinq upon the credibility of •t~itnesses involves to some extent
the J·udg. ing of what ooes on in the minds of ot~ers anrl 1s therefore
·
·
· t ll 1 ng
fraught with uncertainty.
~hether one bel1eves a w1tness 1s e .
the truth often depends as much or more upon t~e impress1on the ~lt
nessismaking
as upon
the
words he
says.
His aopearance
and Services
demeanor.
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his manner of expression and tone of voice, his apparent frankness or candor, or the want.of it; his forthrightness in answerlng, or h1s tendency to hes1tate or evade, and in fact his whole
personality go into the composit effect of the testimony. This
is so even though the hearer may not be paying particular attention
to nor separately evaluating such factors. Child v. Child 332 P.
2d 981, 985, 8 Utah 2d 261.
'
To enable the Trial Judge to make his finding of fact, not only did
he have the advantage of observing the witnesses and passing upon their
credibility, he also had additional supporting evidence to establish each
of his findings on the four critical questions of fact.
l.

Was the $5,000.00 a loan or an investment?

In addition to the testimony that the funds were an investment, the
check itself had the letters "Inv." written thereon.

When asked if he wrote

the abbreviation on the check, plaintiff could only respond "I don't recall."
(Tr. p. 12)
~ich

No evidence was presented to even suggest any other means by

the abbreviation was so placed.

Thus, in addition to defendant's tes-

timony, which the Trial Judge chose to believe, plaintiff's own exhibit
helped to substantiate the Court's findings.
2.

Was repayment conditional or unconditional?

In addition to defendant's testimony that repayment of the funds was conditional upon the film making a profit, (Tr. p. 19-20) the Trial Judge received
in evidence a letter written by defendant to plaintiff marked Exhibit 3-P.
(R. p. 22)

Enclosed with said letter was a copy of a letter which described

the financial statement referred to in defendant's letter, (Tr. p. 24) and
~en

asked by the Court if the financial report was attached, defendant res-

Donded, "I think

1

did."

(Tr. p. 24)

Defendant's uncertainty on this point

cnly further strengthens his credibility.

A less than truthful person could

'asily positively claim a document was attached to a letter, especially if

:"e olleged attac~ed document cannot be found at a later date.
l'

Nevertheless,
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Court with uncertainty as to whether he in fact attached the financial
report.

However, a subsequent letter written by plaintiff to defendant

acknowledges receipt of defendant's letter "along with a report on your
progress.

The report stated a corporation would be formed by October,

I would hear.
haven't heard."

a~

Approximately five months have expired since then and 1
(Ex P-4, R. p. 24)

Plaintiff received the financial

report and was well informed as to the financial status of the film.
To add further evidence to the finding that repayment was conditional,
defendant states in Exhibit P-3, "I'm hoping that foreign sales will make
it possible to give a remii:ta!'ce cf

t~e ~s.ooo.oo

sooner. "

(R. p. 22)

Defendant testified that he was hoping foreign sales would generate sufficient income to return the investment of plaintiff.

(Tr. p. 25)

Thus, in

addition to defendant's testimony, plaintiff's Exhibits P-3 and P-4 helped
to substantiate the Court's findings.
3.

How was the $5,000.00 to be used?

In addition to defendant's testimony that the funds were to be used
to help finance the final stages of the film, (Tr. p. 19,21) plaintiff's
Answers to Interrogatories acknowledged that the funds were to be used to
"assist the defendant in his film ventures, and in paying his personal famil)
expenses."

(Tr. p. 10, R. p. 19)

Thus, even though plaintiff initially

denied knowing a portion of the funds would be
p. g)

used for the film, (Tr.

the record clearly shows he knew a portion of the funds were to be

used for production costs of a film, specifically, "Sing a Sad Song for Sara'
(Tr. p. 9, R. 0 . 19)

Therefore, in addition to the defendant's testimony as

to how the funds were to be used, plaintiff's interrogatories helped to sut·
stantiate the Court's findings.
4.

Did olaintiff have an ownership interest in the film?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-6Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In addition to defendant's testimony that plaintiff had a two percent ownership interest in net profits, defendant

provided plaintiff with an up-to-

date progress report, which was his custom to do for investors. (R. p. 22)
Thus, in addition to defendant's testimony, Exhibit P-3 helped to substantiate the Court's findings.
Plaintiff's argument deals with three "elements" that he suggests should
overturn the Court's findings:
1.

That a demand for repayment of a loan was made by plaintiff on

defendant by letter;
2.

That defendant did not contradict the loan claim in his response,

3.

That defendant's wife endorsed the check and deposiie1

and;
the funds

into a personal account.
With regard to plaintiff's demand for repayment, it is significant that
the transfer took place in August 1969, and according to plaintiff's testimony, was to be repaid within one year.

(Tr. p. 4)

However, it was not

until two years later, August 1971, that plaintiff made a demand for repayment of the funds and there is no testimony to show plaintiff referred to
the transfer as a loan at any time before the letter of August 1971.

If

plaintiff had actually considered the transfer to be a loan to be repaid
·•ithin one year, surely he would have pressured for payment sooner than he
did.

Plaintiff's Exhibits P-2 (R. p. 23) and P-4 (R. p. 24) make it very

clear that plaintiff was in serious financial trouble whereby he stood to
lose all his property and this may well have clouded his recollection of
the true nature of the transfer of the funds.
As to the plaintiff's failure to contradict the use of the term "loan,"
defendant's letter response of August 16, 1971 (R. p. 22) when taken as a
•hole,
clearly
contradicts
allegation
the
transfer
was aandloan.
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Finally, with regard to where the funds were deposited, defendant
testified that he was in Mexico at the time the check arrived and the
funds were needed in the bank.

(Tr. p. 26)

Thus, it is totally reasonable

that defendant's wife would endorse the check and deposit the funds in the
bank.

Whether the funds went to the defendant's personal account or busines•

account is not clear inasmuch as both accounts were in the same bank.
p. 29-30)

(Tr.

Defendant further testified that he thought the funds went

into his business account, but he didn't know for sure.

(Tr. p. 29-30)

Plaintiff's counsel attempts to diminish the significance of the abbreviation "Inv." on the original check by claiming "It must have been addea
to the check sometime after it was drawn.", because it does not show up on
Exhibit P-1, a xerox copy of the check.

(Plaintiff-Appellant Brief p. 5)

There is no testimony whatsoever to support this theory.

The first time

defend ant's counse 1 ever saw the or i gina 1 check and the abbreviation there·
on was at the trial.

Defendant has no way of knowing when Exhibit A, the

xerox copy of the check, was made or by whom.

Nor does defendant

know~~

the abbreviation was placed on the check.
Plaintiff's counsel places great emphasis on the Trial Court's comments
at the end of the evidence.
reviewed on appeal.

Defendant argues that this is not proper to be

The comments by the Trial Judge at the close of the

testimony do not constitute evidence.

Nevertheless, if considered, the

comments give more credence to the Court's ultimate findings.

After consid:·

ing all testimony, Exhibits, and weighing the credibility of the witnesses,
the Court found in favor of the defendant.
Thus it is clear that the Trial Court applied the proven facts and
made findings supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff's counsel would have this Honorable Court believe the CJS~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Continental Bank & Trust Co.__v_~~~art, 291 P.2d 890, 4 Utah 2d 153
(1955), and In Re Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657, 117 Utah 151 (1950) provide
a basis upon which this Court can rely to reverse t~e Judgment.

However,

even a cursory review of the facts in both cases reveal that neither case is
even remotely similar to the instant case and as such should have no bearing
upon the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court.
POINT II
WHERE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S
RULING AND THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE, THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED.
The case of O'Gara vs. Findlay, 306 P.2d 1073, 6 Utah 2d 102 (1957),
states the applicable law on appeal, namely that this Court will not overturn
the Trial Court's findings unless the Trial Court misapplies proven facts or
makes findings clearly against the weight of the evidence.

In the instant

case, the findings were supported by the exhibits presented at the trial
as well as the testimony of the defendant which the Trial Court chose to
believe.

The evidence supporting the Judgment in the instant case is over-

'•helming and in complete accord with the Trial Court's findings.
CONCLUSION
THE (DEFENDANT) HAVING PREVAILED BELOW IS ENTITLED TO HAVE US
SURVEY THE EVIDENCE, AND EVERY REASONABLE INFERENCE AND INTENDMENT THAT CAN FAIRLY BE DRAWN THEREFROM, IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO HIM. Child vs. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 983 8 Utah 2d 261.
The law in Utah is very clear that if there is substantial evidence which
furnishes a reasonable basis in support of the lower Court's findings, when
~idence

is viewed most favorable to the findings, Judgment based thereon must

be affirmed.

Lake vs. Pinder, 368 P.2d 593, 13 Utah 2d 76, Jensen vs. Eddy,

514 ?.2d 1142, 30 Utah 2d 154.

In the instant case the Trial Judge chose to

lelieve the testimony of the defendant, which taken together with the supporting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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documentary evidence, provides not only substantial, but overwhelming
evidence to support the Court's findings.

To find otherwise would require

one to ignore the vantage point of the Trial Judge in assessing the credibility of witnesses and to misconstrue the documentary evidence.
Therefore, the defendant respectfully submits that the lower Court
was fully justified in finding no cause of action and said Judgment is
supported by substantial evidence which provides the basis for the Judgment
to be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Jon M. Jeppson
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee

I hereby certify that I delivered eleven (11) copies of the foregoing
brief to the Utah Supreme Court, State of Utah, this _ _ day of December,
1g77_

also certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the foregoing

brief to Richard B. Cuatto, 318 Kearns Sui lding, Salt lake City, Utah 84101,
the attorney for plaintiff-appellant, this

day of December, 1977, pas·

tage preprepaid thereon.
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